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PAUL BENDER t
The Brethren is "an account of the inner workings of the
Supreme Court from 1969 to 1976-the first seven years of Warren
E. Burger's tenure as Chief Justice of the United States." . The
authors are newspaper reporters who are not lawyers. They do
not approach the Court through its published written opinions, as
lawyers usually do. Instead, they base their book primarily on in-
formation obtained through confidential interviews with a large
number 2 of former law clerks (presumably clerks who served at the
Court during the Terms in question), with "several dozen" former
Court employees (probably Justices' secretaries and messengers for
the most part), and with "several" Justices, none of whom is ex-
plicitly identified. 3 In addition to information obtained orally
from these sources, the authors secured, from "dozens" of them,
"thousands of pages" 4 of confidential internal court documents-
"internal memoranda between Justices, letters, notes taken at con-
ference, case assignment sheets, diaries, unpublished drafts of opin-
ions and, in several instances, drafts that were never circulated even
to the other Justices." These internal papers constitute the "core
documentation" of the book.5
f Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1954, LL.B. 1957, Har-
vard University. Professor Bender served as law clerk to Mr. Justice Frankfurter at
the 1959 Term.
I B. WOODWARD & S. ARmSTONG, THE BRETmN 2 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as THE BRETHREN].
2 The authors say they interviewed "more than 170" law clerks. Id. 3. This
is almost the number of clerks who worked at the Court during the seven Terms
covered by the book. Of course, useful information may not have been received
from every clerk who was interviewed. The authors go on to say, however, that
'[i]n virtually every instance we had at least one, usually two, and often three or
four reliable sources in the chambers of each Justice for each of the seven years."
Id. 4. If the authors bad an average of two sources per chambers per year, that
would make about 125 sources, the large majority of whom were probably clerks.
Thus, it is likely that most of the law clerks who served the Justices during the
period covered by the book also served to some degree as "sources" for the authors.
3 However, Chief Justice Burger is clearly not among them. The authors note
that the Chief Justice "declined to assist us in any way." Id. 3.
- There were enough documents to fill "eight file drawers." Id. 4.
5Id. 4.
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I. THE BOOK
The Brethren itself consists of a prologue, followed by separate
chapters devoted to each of the seven Supreme Court Terms be-
tween 1969 and 1976. The prologue briefly treats President Nixon's
appointment of then-Judge Warren E. Burger to the position of
Chief Justice. The perspectives employed here are different from
those ordinarily used in describing events of this type. For example,
we first see Chief Justice Earl Warren, just after Nixon's election
and having already announced his intention to resign from the
Court, taking his "ritual" Saturday lunch with his law clerks at
Washington's Metropolitan Club. Warren, who is "haunted" by
the prospect of a Nixon-selected Chief Justice, suggests "with a
grin" that " 'we all write down on a piece of paper who we think
the nominee will be.'" Warren (to my surprise) names Burger.
6
We next see Nixon and Burger, at Nixon's invitation, conferring
privately at the White House shortly after the inauguration about
the state of the federal judiciary. We learn that "Nixon was im-
pressed. . . . Judge Burger knew what he was talking about."
John Ehrlichman, summoned to join the meeting, concludes "that
if ever a man was campaigning for elevation in the judiciary, it was
Warren Burger." 7 Later, Justice Stewart, who is being mentioned
as a possible replacement for Warren, calls on Nixon in order to
withdraw himself from consideration. Their conversation is re-
counted. And so on.
In almost all instances, these private events are described as if
the authors had directly observed or listened to them; many conver-
sations are set forth verbatim. The authors also often write as
though they were privy to the thoughts of the participants in the
events they describe.8 Thus, Justice Stewart's "stomach knotted as
he drove through the Washington traffic" to see Nixon; Nixon said,
"'Potter, there has been an awful lot of support for you [as Chief
Justice]'" and asked "Why?," "in surprise," when Stewart said he
wanted to be out of the running for the job; and, as Stewart drove
back to the Court, he "regretted that he had given phony reasons for
taking himself out." 9
6 Id. 11 (quoting Chief Justice Warren).
7 Id. 12-13.
8 The authors admit to having "attributed thoughts, feelings, conclusions, pre-
dispositions and motivations to each of the Justices. This information comes from
the Justices themselves, their diaries or memoranda, their statements to clerks or
colleagues, or their positions as regularly enunciated in their published Court
opinions." Id. 4.
9 Id. 16-17.
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The chapters devoted to each Court Term are entirely episodic
in nature. They focus on cases decided during that Term, the num-
ber of cases ranging from as few as five to more than a dozen. The
cases treated are not thematically related and apparently were chosen
for the book either because of their obvious importance as land-
mark decisions on great public issues (the abortion cases, 10 the
Nixon tapes case," the Pentagon Papers case,12 and the capital-pun-
ishment cases 13) or because the authors had obtained relatively
interesting internal memoranda an anecdotes relating to them. The
authors suggest that cases were selected primarily because they
provided insight into the Court's "internal dynamics." 14
When cases are discussed at length,15 we follow their step-by-
step progress within the Court, from the original consideration of
the petition for certiorari or jurisdictional statement through the
oral argument, the Court conference, the assignment of the majority
opinion, the preparation of draft opinions within the various cham-
bers, negotiations among Justices over drafts and votes, and the final
public announcement of the decision. Briefer treatments may
show only one or two of these stages. Much of the description of
the workings of the Court is based on the internal Court documents
that the authors obtained; these documents are often quoted or
summarized. As in the prologue, however, private thoughts and
conversations also receive great emphasis.
The treatment of the 1973 abortion cases provides a more or
less typical example of the general character of the bulk of The
Brethren. Thus, after oral argument we learn that "Douglas
ascribed to Burger the most blatant political motives" in his (ulti-
mately successful) effort to assign the majority opinion to Justice
Blackmun, despite Burger's being an apparent member of the mi-
nority in the cases. 16  Justice Blackmun, "hid[den] away in the
recesses of the Justices' library," then prepares the first draft of his
opinion for the Court. 17 After five months, one of his law clerks,
at last permitted to look over the draft, is "astonished" that the
3
0 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"1 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
12 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
13 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
14 TiH BRETHREN, supra note 1, at 2.
'5 The Nixon tapes case, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), takes
up the greatest amount of space-about 60 pages. More typical is the Pentagon
Papers case, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), which
occupies about 12 pages.
16 THE BnEnmFN, supra note 1, at 169-72.
17Id. 182.
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Justice's work is "crudely written and poorly organized" and does
not "explain on what [legal or constitutional] basis Blackmun had
arrived at the apparent conclusion that women had.., a right to
abortion." Is Justice Stewart joins this draft even though he dis-
agrees with its reasoning and is troubled by "its inelegant construc-
don and language." 19 Blackmun is "disturbed" by a dissent Justice
White has prepared and decides he has "more work to do." 20 After
a "lobbying" visit from the Chief Justice, and after the Chief Justice
"shift[s] sides to provide the crucial fifth vote" for a Blackmun
opinion in another case, Blackmun decides near the end of the
Term to withdraw his abortion opinion, although five Justices have
already joined it. The case will thus be reargued the next Term
with the participation of Justices Powell and Rehnquist (who had
not been appointed in time to participate in the first argument).
Blackmun tells his clerks that more votes will mean wider public
acceptance for the opinion and that " 'I think we can get Powell.' "21
Justice Douglas is "enraged." He suspects that the Chief Justice
will use the summer to sway Blackmun to Burger's view on the
merits of the cases. Douglas circulates a written dissent (quoted
at length) that he threatens to publish if the cases are put over; it
accuses the Chief Justice of improperly trying "to bend the Court
to his will by manipulating assignments." 22 The Court thereupon
"erupted in debate" about whether Douglas was bluffing. Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart "pleaded with Douglas to recon-
sider." As the authors describe the Justices' position, "[t]he Chief
might be a scoundrel, but making public the Court's inner machina-
tions was a form of treason." 23 Douglas relents, in part because
Blackmun promises that his vote is a firm one. Ultimately, Justice
Powell does join the majority after reargument. He concludes "that
the Constitution did not provide meaningful guidance ... [so that]
he would just have to vote his 'gut.' " 24 The Chief Justice remains
undecided about his vote for weeks, vexing the other Justices, who
want the long-delayed opinion to come down. He finally joins the
majority opinion, but only after being confronted about his delay
by Justice Stewart, who says to him at conference, "'Vote now or let
18 Id. 183.
19 Id. 184.
20 Id. 186.
21Id. 186-87 (quoting Justice Blackmun).
221d. 187.
23 Id. 188.
24 Id. 230.
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the decision come down with only eight votes.' "" 25 We are told
that Justices Brennan and Stewart thought the Chief Justice was
"stalling" so that the abortion cases would be announced after the
second Nixon inauguration: It would be "embarrassing for Burger
to stand there, swearing in the man who had appointed him, having
just supported a sweeping and politically volatile opinion that re-
pudiated that man's views." 26
Interspersed throughout these chapters are vignettes of indi-
vidual Justices at work, and even at play: Justice White, a "fierce
competitor," cheating at basketball with the clerks; 27 Justice
Marshall, "putting on" unsuspecting tourists who mistake him for
an elevator operator; 28 the Chief Justice, complaining about the
unsuitability of his small office.29 There are also observations about
the Justices by other Justices and clerks: "Black was being too emo-
tional. Ever since his stroke, Black had been increasingly unpre-
dictable, testy and belligerent, Harlan thought." 30 "Powell . . .
found White an enigma." 31 In conjunction with the feelings and
motivations that the authors attribute directly to their subjects,
this material is strongly suggestive of the personalities and capacities
of the individual members of the Court. These personal characteri-
zations are an important part of the book, designed by the authors
to "help explain the decisions and actions." 32
Indeed, the personality and capacities of Chief Justice Burger,
and the extremely negative reaction of the other Justices to him,
provide perhaps the book's only consistent theme. The Chief Jus-
tice is shown throughout as vain, pompous, manipulative, and prone
to self-deception; as a judge of mediocre intellect and limited ability
at his craft; as a Justice incapable of moral or intellectual leadership
on the Court. Every other Justice is repeatedly critical-often
openly so before law clerks or other Justices-of the Chief Justice's
motives, capacities, or both. Justices other than the Chief get gen-
erally mixed reviews from their peers, the law clerks, and the au-
thors. Justice Rehnquist, for example, is shown as being friendly
and smart, but intellectually dishonest and excessively conservative.
Justice Douglas is "the greatest living jurist" (Justice Blackmun's
25 Id. 236 (quoting Justice Stewart).
26Id. 236.
27 Id. 185.
281d. 59.
291d. 29.
8o Id. 46.
31 Id. 259.
321d. 4.
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characterization) ,33 but rude, insensitive, and irresponsible. Jus-
tice Harlan and Chief Justice Warren seem to be the only relatively
unqualified heroes, although for different reasons. Warren is shown,
in retrospect (and especially as compared with his successor), as a
progressive and effective leader of the Court. Harlan is perhaps the
single most impressive figure in the book-a judge of great ability,
dedication, unfailing courtesy, and absolute integrity. Of the pres-
ent members of the Court, the portrait offered of Justice Brennan
seems to be the most favorable. Justice Brennan, now the senior
member of the Court, is shown as being on the correct side of
substantive issues,m as conscientious, effective, friendly, and humane,
but somewhat too prone to political manipulation within the Court.
The Brethren is journalism, not legal analysis. Nevertheless,
a number of aspects of the book are of interest to lawyers. This is
especially so since the book-an instant best seller in hardcover,
after newspaper syndication of substantial excerpts, and obviously
destined for vast distribution in paperback-will have a significant
impact on public perception of the Supreme Court and the
profession.m
II. CONFIDENTIALrTY AT THE COURT
The Brethren is based almost entirely on material and infor-
mation that can, with some degree of accuracy, be considered to have
been confidential before its publication there. The propriety and
potential effect of alleged breaches of confidentiality in the prepara-
tion of the book have been widely discussed.
36
The precise nature of the confidentiality constraints at the
Supreme Court is not entirely clear. Information about decisions
themselves is certainly not supposed to be leaked before the deci-
sions are officially announced, but neither these authors nor their
sources have committed that kind of breach.87 Internal memoranda,
33 Id. 185.
34 The authors appear generally to agree with the direction of the Court during
Earl Warren's tenure as Chief Justice.
35 A movie version, alas, seems unlikely.
36 See, e.g., Lewis, Supreme Court Confidential, N.Y. REv. BooKs, Feb. 7, 1980,
at 3, 5-6; Will, The Injudicial Justices, NEwswEEK, Dec. 10, 1979, at 140. See also
Baker, Under the Black Robe, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1979, at A23, col, 5 (The "law
clerks know all. What's more, half of them tell all .. ").
37 The authors do recount one instance in which Time magazine, almost by
inadvertence, acquired and published advance information about a decision. A law
clerk had talked with a Time reporter about the 1973 abortion decisions, Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), expecting
them to come down imminently, in order to provide background for a Time story.
In the ordinary course, that story would have been published after the decisions had
1980]
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preliminary opinion drafts, and the like (all of which are recorded
in The Brethren) are also probably not meant for contemporaneous
publication, even after decisions are announced, but such material
has, in the past, been made available to and been used by legal
scholars 38 and historians 39 after some years have passed. Perhaps
only Justices-and not clerks-should ever be entitled to authorize
such uses. In modern times, however, at least one Justice, who was
highly sensitive to the proprieties and the Court's traditions, regu-
larly provided his clerks with a bound set of opinions written in the
chambers during the Term. Included in this volume were a number
of internal memoranda and preliminary opinion drafts. It has also
been common for law clerks joining law faculties to share with their
colleagues inside Court stories and views of Court personalities very
similar to those recounted in The Brethren.40 (Much of The Breth-
ren itself could probably have been pieced together from such mul-
tiple hearsay, although not with nearly the same sense of immediacy.)
As for the "secret" Court conference, some Justices keep detailed
logs of conference proceedings, and Justices often relate particular
conference incidents to their clerks. The Brethren shows the dif-
ferent views among the Justices about sharing this kind of informa-
tion with clerks. The Chief Justice appears as perhaps the least
forthcoming; for example, after certain minor leaks to the Solicitor
General's staff are discovered, he observes that "he avoided the
possibility of leaks by not telling his own clerks about votes or
discussions at conference." 41  (Justice Brennan is said to have dis-
been announced; however, the Court delayed announcement of the cases, and Time
published the expected result anyway. Threatening to call in the F.B.I. to admin-
ister lie-detector tests so that the responsible person could be found and fired, Chief
Justice Burger asked the Justices to question their clerks about the leak. The guilty
law clerk quickly admitted his responsibility and offered to resign, but an apology
to the Chief Justice sufficed. TnE BRmEm -E, supra note 1, at 237-38. On an
earlier occasion, Solicitor General Griswold told the Chief Justice that clerks were
leaking information about decision dates to lawyers on the Solicitor General's staff.
F.B.I. lie-detector tests were proposed by the Chief Justice then, too, but the other
Justices objected; instead, a committee on security was established. The law clerks
were also forbidden to play basketball with members of the Solicitor General's office.
Id. 150.
38 A. Bicxxr, TmE UiNa-tms OPmNONs OF Mr. JusTicE BnADEs s (1957).
39A. MASON, HABR.L FisKE STONE: PILLAR OF TnE LAw (1956). See also
W. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN (1974).
40 Today's law clerks may, in general, be unreliable confidants. A story now
circulating has it that Justice Brennan recently said, at an annual dinner for past
and present law clerks, that he was considering retirement. This news was carried
by the wire services before the dinner was over.
All the Justices seem to agree that clerks should not talk to reporters during
their service at the Court. At the Chief Justice's initiative, the clerks are now
informed of this rule at a beginning-of-Term social occasion. THE BmnMMN, supra
note 1, at 356.
41 Id. 150.
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posed of this suggestion by observing, "You can tell he doesn't
talk to his clerks by reading his opinions.") 42
The authors seem keenly aware that their book is based upon
-confidential material. "For ... nearly two hundred years," they
say, "the Court has made its decisions in absolute secrecy .... No
American institution has so completely controlled the way it is
viewed by the public." 43 They are also certainly aware of the per-
tceived value of confidentiality in many circumstances. For example,
they note that they have kept the identity of their sources confiden-
tial because "[t]his assurance . . . was necessary to secure their co-
.operation." 4 Although the situations of reporters and judges are
obviously not identical, the authors might well agree that Justices,
too, may find it easier to share ideas with clerks and other Justices
if there is an assurance that confidentiality is to be substantially pre-
served.45 A Justice, for example, clearly ought to feel completely
free to change his mind about a case as a result of discussions within
the Court. His openmindedness may decrease, however, if there is
a significant possibility that his changes of position will be made
public.
Is The Brethren a justifiable breach of expectations of confi-
dentiality within the Court (assuming, as seems likely, that it is to
some extent a breach of those expectations)? For the authors
of The Brethren, the answer is easy: The Court's "deliberative
process" has been "hidden from public view," yet "[m]uch of recent
history, notably the period that included the Vietnam war and the
multiple scandals known as Watergate, suggests that the detailed
steps of decision making, the often hidden motives of the decision
makers, can be as important as the eventual decisions themselves." 46
The analogies to Vietnam and Watergate are intriguing, but the fact
is that the authors did not uncover-nor is it likely that they ever
expected to uncover-dishonesty or corruption in the Court re-
42 Id. (quoting justice Brennan).
43 Id. 1. I am not sure that this sentence is entirely accurate: Presidents and
senators, for example, surely have internal memoranda, conversations, and even
formal meetings that they try to keep secret, and often do. The Supreme Court,
on the other hand, publicly explains the reasoning behind its decisions in its written
opinions and publishes dissents from within the institution. These opinions contain
significant information and evidence about internal processes, although that infor-
mation is far from complete. It is true, however, that the Court, unlike Congress
and the Executive, has not often been the subject of direct contemporaneous investi-
gative reporting of its internal procedures and deliberations.
44 Id. 3-4.
45 The authors say that they "ensure[d]" that their project "would in no way
interfere with the ongoing work of the Court" by limiting their investigation and
interviews to cases reaching the Court before 1977. Id. 2. Would they have this
-temporally limited a view of the needs of press confidentiality?
46 Id. 1.
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motely similar to, or as publicly harmful as, that uncovered by
those other recent examples of investigative reporting. Indeed, as
I suggest below, the Court, as depicted in The Brethren, seems
gratifyingly scandal-free, although other procedural deficiencies and
improper manipulations are certainly evident. What the authors
really seem to be saying is that the Court's internal secrecy itself
provides both the occasion and the justification for their efforts,
as reporters, to secure its breach. The deliberative processes of an
important policymaking organ of government are, in their view,
necessarily a matter of public interest and a fit subject for journal-
istic inquiry.
I find it difficult to quarrel seriously with this general proposi-
tion, or to exempt the Supreme Court or this book from its reach.
My view of the situation might be different if The Brethren were
not a book published several years after the events in question but
a series of investigative reporting expos&s-in a newspaper, on tele-
vision, or in a magazine- of immediately past or pending Court pro-
ceedings. Such intensive daily or weekly media coverage of internal
Court maneuvers, tentative votes in pending cases, and similar mat-
ters would, I think, seriously endanger the character of the institu-
tion. The changes in Court attitudes, procedures, and even sub-
stantive doctrine that might occur as a result of a consciousness on
the part of Justices and clerks that positions taken at each stage of
the decisional process might immediately appear in the press would
very likely not be changes for the better. That kind of reporting
may be protected by the first amendment, but I would try to dis-
suade a reporter from attempting it, and I suspect (and hope) that
sources for such an effort would be hard to come by. Publication
of The Brethren may perhaps make such destructive press attention
somewhat more of a threat than it has been, but the book itself
seems to me to be a once-in-a-generation phenomenon that will
not lead inexorably in that harmful direction.47 The Court would
thus seem well advised to ignore the breaches of confidentiality that
produced The Brethren, rather than to make oppressive changes in
internal relations and practices in order to tighten security against
a possible sequel.48  The Brethren is not a harmful book, unless the
Court, by overreacting to it, chooses to make it so.
47 During the 1979 Term information about a pending decision in a case about
the rights of the press leaked to a television news reporter, who put it on the air.
The source was apparently an employee in the Court's printing office who, upon
being discovered, was transferred elsewhere. The information, as broadcast, was
quite garbled and generally useless.
48 The quality of the clerk-Justice relationship is already in sufficient danger,
most Justices now having four clerks.
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The moral propriety of the behavior of Court employees and
Justices who provided material to these authors seems to me to be a
more difficult issue.49 The first amendment certainly did not re-
.quire such cooperation. Are the inadequacies and behind-the-scenes
machinations of the Burger Court sufficiently dreadful to demand
public exposure, despite implicit or explicit promises of confiden-
tiality by clerks and other Court employees? Once it was clear that
the book was to be written anyway, might a law clerk or Justice jus-
tifiably conclude that it might as well be complete, or accurate, and
furnish information on that basis? What degree, if any, of dis-
affection with the Court's leadership or current doctrines would
justify a Justice in breaching the secrecy of the conference? I am
not entirely sure of the answers I would give to questions like these.
I confess, however, to feeling both regret and uneasiness over the
magnitude of the disclosures that produced The Brethren, even as I
conclude both that the public has a legitimate interest in the subject
of the book, and that the end product was undoubtedly improved
by the variety and depth of its sources.
III. Is The Brethren FAcr oR FICTION?
Does The Brethren present an accurate picture of the "inner
workings" of the Supreme Court? The book, as noted below, con-
tains numerous errors of law and legal analysis. Given the multiple-
hearsay (and perhaps self-serving) nature of much of its evidence
of conversations, attitudes, and motivations, it probably contains
numerous factual errors as well. The authors' narrative style also
tends to oversimplify and overdramatize complex people, motives,
and events. Complete "truth" about matters of this nature is, in
any case unattainable. Bearing all these qualifications in mind, it
nevertheless seems to me that The Brethren is an essentially accurate
rendering, for a lay audience, of the cast of characters at the Court
and the kinds of maneuverings that take place in the decisional
process surrounding important or controversial cases.
The most important caveat I would affix to this judgment con-
cerns the fact that cases were chosen for treatment in the book be-
cause of their importance or divisiveness. A large part of the
Court's work, however-a part that understandably gets very little
attention in The Brethren-is not political or divisive. Many Su-
preme Court cases are decided unanimously; in others the result
is a foregone conclusion and there is little internal debate; a large
4 9 So far as we know, all the sources knew they were contributing to a book;
the information they provided was not euchred out of them.
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number of cases also involve issues that are more technical than
political. These relatively noncontroversial cases are the glue that
holds the Court together. A reader of The Brethren might wonder
how the institution can survive with so much apparent mutual
anger, distrust, and disrespect among the Justices. One important
explanation is that, at most times, there is a large core of more or
less routine, even dull, Court work about which there is either
substantive agreement or, at the least, a strong sense of common
purpose.
Lawyers will be vexed by The Brethren's constant errors and
imprecisions in describing legal issues and procedures. Cases that
appear in the book are usually recognizable to those familiar with
the originals, but the authors' statements are very often importantly
wrong or incomplete. The Court has never held, for example,
"that before criminal prosecutions could begin, accused pornog-
raphers must be allowed a hearing to determine whether the mate-
rials are obscene." 50 School busing decisions are not properly re-
garded as "conflicting" when they rest on opposite findings of
relevant facts. 51 Kirby v. Illinois 52 did not merely "refuse to extend"
Warren Court precedents on the right to a lawyer at a line-up;
rather, it drew a distinction that is totally inconsistent with the
reasoning of those precedents.53 Justice Brennan did not "dissent"
in Stanley v. Georgia; " he concurred in the result. Federal agents
are not "normally immune" from suits because they were "acting
officially." 1i One could go on and on. The book would have
benefited if the authors had had the manuscript reviewed by some-
one more knowledgeable than they in matters of federal law and
procedure, someone who might also have told them that "cert" is not
a word, but an abbreviation that deserves a period at its end. 6
IV. EVALUATING THE COURT'S "INNER WORKINGS"
Now that we have peered inside the Supreme Court (if only
through a somewhat fuzzy lens), what may we conclude about the
people and processes thus revealed? No one, I expect, has been
5 0 THE BRETHiEN, supra note 1, at 252.
51 Id. 426-27.
r2406 U.S. 682 (1972).
53 See THE BREaimN, supra note 1, at 223.
54 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See THE BmzTmisN, supra note 1, at 195.
55 Id. 68.
56 The level of accuracy of legal analysis in the book, however, seems at least
equal to that contained in most mass-media reports of Supreme Court decisions.
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under the impression that the Court of the early and mid-1970s
was an especially distinguished Supreme Court. The Brethren will
not disturb this view. We ought to be pleased-but again not
surprised-at the moral caliber of the Court, at the apparent
complete absence of corruption or improper political influence.
When a lobbyist tries to talk to two Justices about the merits of a
pending case, they react as though he were contagious. 57 There are
no calls from (or to) the White House or the Congress about pend-
ing decisions. Greed and ambition appear to play no part in de-
cisionmaking. As for internal Court politics, the authors directly
describe but one instance of anything resembling improper vote-
trading on the merits of a case. Whatever actually transpired on
that particular occasion,58 Court "politics" as shown in The
Brethren generally involve proper matters for compromise in a
collegial body, such as the breadth or wording of a proposed ma-
jority opinion, the timing of the decisional process, or certiorari
policy. One cannot help being dismayed-even alarmed-at the
seemingly endless series of improprieties regarding Court traditions
attributed to the Chief Justice-especially those traditions connected
with the assignment of opinions-but even here there may be some
cause for optimism. Most of the other Justices are agog at the
Chief's behavior; 89 there is resistance to him, even by Justices who
agree with him on the merits; and it appears by the end of the book
that most traditional practices will ultimately survive.
57Id. 79-85.
58 Justice Brennan, allegedly convinced in his own mind that a criminal de-
fendant in a capital case has received an unconstitutionally unfair trial, nevertheless
decides to provide a fifth vote to affirm because he does not wish to offend Justice
Blackmun, who has worked hard on the majority opinion and who, if properly
cultivated, shows signs of drawing further away from his alliance with the Chief
Justice. The story comes from a Brennan clerk who tried to convince the Justice
to change his vote in the case and "returned shaken" at Brennan's explanation of
his refusal to do so. Id. 2215.
Brennan's vote here does, indeed, seem somewhat mysterious in view of the
facts revealed in the official report of the case--facts suggesting not only strong
prosecutorial impropriety but also a distinct possibility of the defendant's innocence.
Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972). Yet it seems to me quite unlikely that
Justice Brennan would admit to a law clerk--or to himself-that he was voting
against his constitutional convictions in a serious criminal case. Perhaps the law
clerk, disappointed at his failure to convince his Justice to change his vote, trans-
posed his own clear view of the merits to his apparently unreasonably recalcitrant
boss. Indeed, substantial doubt has been cast on the truth of this episode as
reported in The Brethren. See Lewis, supra note 36, at 3.
59 During the 1975 Term, for example, Justice Brennan is preparing at con-
ference to assign a case in which Justices Burger, Powell, and Rehaquist are in the
minority. The Chief Justice suddenly "decided to switch his vote to the majority.
'Jesus Christ," [Justice] White bellowed, throwing his pencil on the table and
pushing his chair back in disgust. 'Here we go again."' Tim BnaTmmN, supra
note 1, at 423-24.
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The most important things about a Supreme Court are its
opinions and decisions: Are they intelligible? What is their phi-
losophy? Are they correct? What is their impact on the country?
Where are they heading? The authors, whose focus is "inside,"
have little to say about these substantive external questions, al-
though the first seven years of the Burger Court certainly provide a
lot of provocative material. Consider the dangerous contraction in
access to federal courts for plaintiffs seeking to present certain types
of constitutional claims; 60 the premature stagnation of large parts of
the equal protection clause; 61 the enormous and largely unjustifiable
erosion of the concept of "state action"; 62 the curious shift of atten-
tion in the Court from the rights of minorities and the under-
privileged to the rights of business and the middle class. 63 There may
be institutions for which it is true, as Woodward and Armstrong
assert, that "the often hidden motives of the decision makers can be
as important as the eventual decisions themselves." 64 The Supreme
Court, I think, is not such an institution.
The Brethren is moderately entertaining and generally informa-
tive. It may have a beneficial influence on the standards for selec-
tion of Supreme Court Justices in the future (especially Chief Jus-
tices). It will probably-although it should not-adversely affect to
some extent the quality of some relationships on the Court, espe-
cially the relationship between Justices and their law clerks. As an
"inside" account of an institution whose main product and sig-
nificance is a vast body of published opinions and decisions, how-
ever, it fails to contribute substantially to the public's ability to
evaluate the most important-that is, the legally substantive-
aspects of the Burger Court's performance.
60 See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490 (1975); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971).
61 See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976).
62 See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
63 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978);
Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
64 THE BnmmN, supra note 1, at 1.
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